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Quiz 2 · 15 minutes

Quiz first

Covers

Sessions 03 and 04. Levitsky and Way 2002, Munck and Verkuilen 2002, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, and Lührmann and Lindberg 2019.

Format

Ten questions worth 2 points each. Six single choice and four select all that apply.

Rules

Closed book. Phones and laptops away. Write your name and student number at the top of the sheet.

Your best four of the six quizzes count. Pens down when time is called.

Previously

Last week, this week

Session 04
  • Acemoglu and Robinson on why elites concede democracy and when they take it back
  • Lührmann and Lindberg on autocratization led by elected incumbents
Session 05
  • Linz on why presidential democracies break down
  • Cheibub and Limongi on whether the evidence backs him
  • One group exercise

Last week asked how regimes change. This week asks whether the way a democracy picks its government affects how long it lasts.

Opener · any volunteers?

You are writing the constitution of a new democracy

Should voters elect the head of government directly?

01

What does a directly elected leader give voters?

02

What happens when the leader and the legislature disagree?

03

How do you remove a leader who has failed?

Linz 1990 · Dual legitimacy

Two mandates, one fixed clock

Chile 1970

Allende, 36.2 percent

A plurality won by a heterogeneous coalition gave him a six-year mandate to run the government.

Spain 1979

Suárez, 35.1 percent

A plurality of about the same size left him working with other parties to sustain a minority government.

"Who has the stronger claim to speak on behalf of the people: the president or the legislative majority that opposes his policies?"

No democratic principle settles that dispute, Linz argues. In the past the armed forces were often tempted to step in as a mediating power.

Linz 1990 · Zero-sum elections

Spain 1977 as a presidential race

First free election after Franco · share of the vote

Left to right · order from Linz · spacing illustrative

◀ LeftRight ▶
  1. The winner takes the whole executive for a fixed term. The losers wait four or five years with no share of power.
  2. No party had a majority. A left united behind González would have needed the Communists, and a popular-front mood would have run the campaign.
  3. Suárez could hardly have united the right with Fraga's AP, which stood for continuity with Franco.
  4. In a close race, small extremist parties can claim to be the decisive bloc.

A presidential election "would have been far more divisive," Linz concludes. He adds that a centrist electorate defuses the danger, as Goldwater and McGovern learned.

Cheibub and Limongi 2002

The gap is real

1 in 23

Presidential democracies that died in a given year, 1946 to 1999.

1 in 58

Parliamentary democracies that died in a given year.

1 in 8

Democracies of either type that died at income levels like sub-Saharan Africa's.

"We have good reasons to doubt that we understand what causes this difference."

Three claims under test

Majoritarian imperativeIncentives for cooperationCentralized decision making
Cheibub and Limongi · The majoritarian imperative

Minority governments and deadlock

  1. Minority cabinets governed parliamentary democracies 22 percent of the time from 1946 to 1999.
  2. Presidents lacked a majority in about 40 percent of presidential years, close to the third of parliamentary governments in industrialized democracies.
  3. Strom shows that minority cabinets can be a rational choice when parties can shape policy from outside government.
  4. Deadlock needs a veto the legislature cannot override. Parliaments deadlock too when government follows government and no stable majority forms.

Chance a presidential democracy dies in a given year · Table 1

Deadlock between president and congress Deadlock
1 in 26 No deadlock
1 in 31 Seats held by all cabinet parties Minority
1 in 26 Majority
1 in 27 Seats held by the president's party Minority
1 in 22 Majority
1 in 34

The authors find no empirical basis for the fear of deadlock. Look at the bottom pair before you agree.

Cheibub and Limongi · Incentives for cooperation

Presidents build coalitions too

Share of governments that are coalitions · Table 2

Largest party under half the seats Parliamentary
74% Presidential
51% Largest party under a third Parliamentary
96% Presidential
76%
  1. Most prime ministers leave office without an election, 56 percent in 21 industrialized democracies from 1946 to 1995. The threat of early elections is a weak source of party discipline.
  2. The two systems differ in the fallback. If no deal is struck, a parliament faces new elections and a president keeps every portfolio.
  3. Paralysis needs unusual rules. In only 4 percent of presidential years could a president veto a bill with no override.

Coalitions grow more common as parties multiply, in both systems. That cuts against Mainwaring's fear that presidentialism and multipartism are a difficult combination.

Cheibub and Limongi · Table 3

Do coalitions keep presidents alive?

Expected life of a presidential democracy, in years

Largest party holds a third to a half of the seats With a coalition
13.2 No coalition
24.5 Largest party holds under a third With a coalition
54.9 No coalition
23.9
Moderate fragmentation

The president's party is usually the largest, holds about a third of the seats and faces other large parties. Coalitions go with short lives, and the authors call this puzzling.

High fragmentation

Coalitions form more often, and they more than double the expected life of the regime.

Cheibub and Limongi · Where presidents come from

The constitution or the country?

A MILITARY PAST PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTION DEMOCRACY BREAKS DOWN ?
  1. Presidential democracies emerge more often from military dictatorships than from civilian ones. Cheibub and Limongi note that this makes them likelier to fall back into dictatorship.
  2. With origin held constant, presidential democracies still die sooner, as Przeworski and his coauthors found in 2000.
  3. Last week's chapter offers a mechanism. A directly elected president is likelier to be populist, threatens the elite more and may invite more coups (Acemoglu and Robinson, p. 35).

Session 01 warned about how cases are selected. When the cases that adopt an institution differ from the rest, comparing their outcomes mixes the two.

Compare the readings

Two readings, one gap

Linz 1990Cheibub and Limongi 2002
QuestionDoes the form of government decide whether democracy survives?Do the incentives said to follow from each form explain the survival gap?
EvidenceReasoning about institutions, Chile, and a counterfactual SpainData on democracies from 1946 to 1999, and cases from Brazil to Italy
What drives breakdownDual legitimacy and fixed termsHow decision making is organized
The United StatesThe stable exception, thanks to diffuse partiesThe exception, a president with little agenda power
Bottom lineNew democracies, above all divided multiparty ones, do better with parliaments"If parliamentary regimes have a better record of survival than presidential regimes, it is not because they are parliamentary."

Cheibub and Limongi grant that parliaments survive longer. Which of Linz's links do they break, and which still stand?

Next up

Before Thursday 22 October

Week 06. Electoral systems.

Read

Carey, John M., and Simon Hix. 2011. "The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems." American Journal of Political Science 55(2), 383-397.

Read

Lijphart, Arend. 2012. Patterns of Democracy, 2nd edition. Yale University Press, chapter 8.

  1. Week 6 class on electoral systems
  2. Complement on concepts, measurement and validityM2170
  3. Quiz 3 opens the class. It covers Sessions 05 and 06.Uni Dufour U300