2026 APSA Annual Meeting · Boston, MA

The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Sponsor Firm Politics in Frontier Investment

Jihye Park  ·  Nicolas Bau  ·  Simone Dietrich
Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva
The question

Development finance runs through firms we do not study

  • DFIs move tens of billions a year to private firms in frontier markets OECD 2016
  • In the US, OPIC from 1971 and the DFC since the BUILD Act of 2018. One continuous instrument Lawson & Nelson 2016
  • Scholarship covers state motives, governance, allocation. The sponsors stay in the background Bau 2026; Bau, Dietrich, Qian & Trinh 2026; Dietrich 2021
  • Approval is not the end. Statutory authority, risk coverage, and diplomacy hold their value only under political conditions
The puzzle

A US federal agency creates the relationship. Why is sponsor political activity organized around particular foreign countries instead?

Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics
Argument

Two kinds of political work, split by who captures the benefit

Institutional maintenance
  • Authorization, appropriations, exposure cap Lawson & Nelson 2016
  • Shared resource, non‑excludable Hansen, Mitchell & Drope 2004
  • Carried by coalitions and trade associations Bombardini & Trebbi 2012; Boehmke, Gailmard & Patty 2013
Project maintenance
  • One firm, one country, one commitment
  • Benefits stop at the exposure holder
  • Carried by the sponsor itself
Political maintenance

Sustained political activity aimed at preserving and activating the public commitments on which long‑duration frontier investments depend.

Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics
The agency’s own arena

Coalitions defend the vehicle. Individual sponsors are almost absent.

Legislative subsidy would put the sponsors here. Hall & Deardorff 2006
597
reports naming OPIC or the DFC, 2005 to 2021
68
distinct filing clients
18
coalitions and trade associations
1
report from the 14 sponsors other than GE
“Support Adequate Budget/Authorization for Ex‑Im Bank, OPIC, TDA, and US International Development Finance Corporation, as appropriate…” Coalition for Employment Through Exports, 2017. Near‑verbatim in 2018. Filed 12 of 13 years, 2006 to 2018. Reports from LobbyView, Kim 2018. Board chaired by Boeing, GE treasurer, CEE 2008
Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics
Figure 2 · Who files on OPIC and the DFC

Two series, two different logics

Lobbying reports naming OPIC or the DFC, split between business coalitions and all other clients, 2005 to 2021
Coalitions flat near 20 a year, then away. The BUILD Act spike is in the lower panel, 13 reports in 2017 to 43 in 2018 and 46 in 2019, with GE alone filing 10 then 14. Same firms on the coalition boards. CEE chaired by Boeing, GE treasurer.
Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics
Theory

A commitment attaches the US government to one firm’s project in one host country.

Tariffs, local content rules, tax regimes, currency restrictions, contract renegotiation. Host‑country risks, answered by country‑organized US instruments.

Jensen 2003; Lawson & Nelson 2016
Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics
Why the country is the unit

Backing is redeemed one country at a time

Country‑defined instruments
  • Risk insurance claims arise from a named sovereign Lawson & Nelson 2016
  • Embassy and State engagement is bilateral
  • Trade agreements, sanctions, country legislation Carcelli 2023; Broz & Hawes 2006
Not our claim
  • Multinationals watch politics wherever they hold assets Hansen & Mitchell 2000; Jensen 2003
  • DFC adds a public dimension, raising the value of access on that country
Hypothesis 1 · Project maintenance

A sponsor firm’s political engagement on a host country is higher where it holds a DFC‑backed project than where it does not.

Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics
Two cases

A political presence built around one country’s asset

First Solar · India
  • USD 500m DFC loan, 2021. Thin‑film solar, Tamil Nadu
  • In‑house registration terminated the year before
  • Re‑registered Dec 2022, twelve months after
  • Q1 2023 filings add DOE and the EOP. Neither appears pre‑award DFC 2021; OpenSecrets 2024
Syrah Resources · Mozambique
  • USD 150m to subsidiary Twigg. Balama graphite, Cabo Delgado. Approved 2023, signed 2024
  • Feeds Vidalia, Louisiana. Value turns on US treatment of Mozambican graphite
  • No prior filing by Syrah, Twigg, or any US entity
  • Registered presence appears the quarter the loan executes DFC 2023; LDA filings, Q2 2024
Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics
Data

An original firm‑by‑country‑by‑year panel

2,833
OPIC and DFC projects, 2000 to 2024
15
infrastructure sponsors matched to a lobbying client
25
DFC host countries
37
firm‑country cells with an award
Outcome
  • Count of a firm’s yearly reports whose issue text names the country
  • Free‑text match, LobbyView Kim 2018
Why infrastructure
  • Immobile, capital‑intensive, long‑lived Dafe & Upadhyaya 2024; Kilby 2013
  • Revenue runs through licences, tariffs, convertibility Jensen 2003
  • Infrastructure identifies a corporate sponsor. Funds and intermediaries do not
Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics
Table 1 · What the count is counting

Every firm‑country cell with host‑country lobbying

FirmCountryAwardFiledReported issue text
AESEl Salvador20172016, 2017“AES operations in El Salvador. Foreign relations, generally.”
AESChile20142015, 2016“Trans‑Pacific Partnership with regards to AES operations in Chile and Vietnam.”
AESDominican Rep.20002007, 2014“Contacts regarding investments in the Dominican Republic.”
AESBrazil20012013, 2014“US‑Brazil trade relations as they pertain to AES businesses.”
ApacheEgypt20042008, 2009“Business and political issues that arise from doing business in Egypt.”
Noble EnergyIsrael20172013, 2014“General oil and gas exploration issues, H.R. 3683, to improve United States‑Israel energy cooperation.”
General ElectricPanama20092007, 2008“United States Panama Free Trade Agreement.”
One host country at a time, tied to a specific policy question bearing on the firm’s presence there. Text reproduced as filed. Award is the year of the firm’s first OPIC or DFC project in that country, and exposure runs on from there.
Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics
Figure 1 · Within‑firm distribution

Where each sponsor points its country‑level activity

Mean lobbying reports per country-year by sponsor firm, split by non-DFC countries, own DFC countries before award, and own DFC countries after award
AES, Apache, Noble Energy all heaviest on their own DFC countries after the award. AES roughly 3× its rate on other countries, roughly 7× its own pre‑award rate. GE runs the other way, highest before the award, consistent with being the largest and most politically active firm in the panel.
Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics
Table 2 · Main estimates

Maintenance and entry

Host‑country lobbying reports DFC award onset
(1)(2)(3)(4)
DFC project in country 1.494**(0.598) 1.049*(0.569)
Any prior lobbying on country 2.219***(0.766)
Prior reports on country, 3 years 0.185**(0.075)
Incidence rate ratio / odds ratio 4.462.85 9.191.20
EstimatorPoissonPoissonLogitLogit
Firm × year FEYesYes
Country FE / Country × year FEYes / –– / YesYes / –Yes / –
Firm FE / Year FE– / YesYes / Yes
Observations5602153,1763,176
SEs clustered by firm. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cols 3–4 on a risk set of 4,001 infrastructure and energy lobbying firms, 6,552 firm‑country‑years, all 35 onsets retained.
Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics
Reading the columns

Access runs in both directions

4.46×
reports on a project country vs. a non‑project country. Firm‑year and country FE
2.85×
under the triple difference. p = 0.065, sample 560 to 215
9.19×
odds of a later award where the firm had already lobbied. Each report over the prior 3 years adds 20 percent
What this rules in, and out

DFC‑backed projects sit inside political relationships that precede the award and continue after public backing is in place. Selection runs partly on prior engagement, so the panel gap is not a randomly assigned award effect.

Access as a standing asset rather than a single purchase. Hall & Deardorff 2006
Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics
Limits

What the design can and cannot carry

Bounds
  • Thin base. 15 sponsors, 37 treated cells, driven by AES, Apache, Noble Energy, GE
  • Free‑text country measure. Operations and US legislation are not separable
  • No event study. Year‑by‑year SEs exceed 2 on the log scale
  • Disclosure misses informal and diplomatic channels. A lower bound
Next
  • Private capital mobilization, once transaction‑level data exists
  • The 2025 turn to critical minerals reshuffles which countries carry salience. Advocacy should follow Nakano 2025; Runde & Bandura 2020; Runde 2021
Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics
Conclusion

The country is an organizing dimension of firm lobbying

  • Sponsors are political actors, and their politics is geographic. Heaviest where their DFC exposure sits, and the filings say so
  • The division of labor is itself a finding. Coalitions hold the vehicle, sponsors hold the exposure Bombardini & Trebbi 2012; Boehmke, Gailmard & Patty 2013
  • DFIs are state strategy and private platform at once. Project durability rests on the sponsor’s standing in one bilateral relationship Malik & Stone 2018; Stone 2026; Brooks & Voeten 2026; Heldt & Meunier 2026
  • Measurement follows. Agency‑ and program‑level designs miss the part organized by geography Hansen & Mitchell 2000; Hall & Deardorff 2006
Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics

Thank you

Jihye Park
Jihye.Park@unige.ch
https://jihyepark.me
Park, Bau & Dietrich · Sponsor Firm Politics
← → to navigate · F for fullscreen